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Abstract
This paper uses a real-life case from political history, recounted by Vaclav Havel,
President of the Czech Republic. Three times in its history, when faced with a serious problem
such as invasion or insurrection, this country’s leaders opted for a “more realistic” solution
(giving way) rather than a “more ethical” one (offering resistance, knowing the high cost in
human lives this would entail). This note analyses the relationship between heroism (adopting a
“more ethical” solution), management and leadership. It pays particular attention to the morality
of the “more ethical” decision, the obligation –or lack of it– to put this decision into effect, and
the relationship between a “more ethical” line of conduct and leadership in the firm.  
Keywords: consequence, courage, decision, ethics, heroism.  
Presented at the 13th Annual EBEN Conference. Cambridge, 12-14 September 2000.MANAGEMENT AND ACTING “BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY”
Introduction (1) 
Can we ask of an entrepreneur or manager that she be ethical? Yes, of course. Indeed,
if she is not ethical, we can say that she is “blind” to a certain aspect of reality, namely, that
which refers to her own development as a person and, therefore, to her ability as a manager (2).
Because, in my opinion, that ability has a fundamental bearing on what comprises the core of
ethics applied to business: the capacity to understand how one’s actions affect one’s own being
and consequently how they affect other people and, consequently, how a manager should take
into account, in her behaviour as a manager, the effects of her actions on others, whether they
be colleagues, subordinates, customers, suppliers, citizens or other stakeholders. 
Therefore,  I  do  not  think  I  will  be  very  wrong  if  I  conclude  that  an  unethical
manager is unlikely to be a good manager. That does not mean that she will not achieve large
profits  or  maximise  the  value  of  her  company’s  shares,  but  she  will  be  neglecting  other
dimensions  of  her  task  as  a  manager.  And  this  will  ultimately  lead  to  a  decline  in  the
company’s capacity for producing and selling useful goods and services on the market, goods
and services that provide a genuine service to its customers, and which, therefore, form the
basis of an attractive mission for the people who work in the company and for its external
stakeholders. As a result, the people management function –her central task as a manager–
will  not  take  sufficiently  into  account  these  people’s  needs,  and  she  will  not  be  able  to
develop sufficiently the organisation’s distinctive competencies. And, lastly, her strategy will
have opportunistic elements and will not fully attain the company’s other goals: perhaps it
will  succeed  in  maximising  value  for  the  shareholders  in  the  short  term  but  it  will
undoubtedly fail in developing the human team or guaranteeing the company’s continuity (3).
However,  the  purpose  of  this  paper  is  not  to  explain  why  a  manager  should  be
ethical, but to reflect on ethics in an extreme situation: can one ask an entrepreneur to be
heroic in her approach to ethics in business? (4)  Or –to break the problem down into smaller
(1) A previous version of this paper (“Leadership, heroism and management”) was presented to the 13th Annual
EBEN Conference, Cambridge, 12-14 September 2000. I am grateful to Joan Fontrodona, Juan C. Vazquez-
Dodero,  Henk  van  Luijk,  Luk  Bouckaert,  participants  at  the  13th  EBEN  Conference  and  two  anonymous
referees  for useful comments. The generous help of the José and Ana Royo Foundation is gratefully appreciated.  
(2) To do good, one must know reality. 
(3) I have developed these subjects in Argandoña (1994, 1999, 2000). See also Pérez-López (1993, 1997, 1998). 
(4) The “classic” concept of the hero in Greek culture identified it with the guardian, the protector or the brave
man. Here I am referring to a more popular sense of heroic as “hazardous remedies but worth trying” (Oxford
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 1974), that is to say, a behaviour whose consequences
could be very harmful to the agent, but that she considers is her duty. Sometimes we refer to heroism as acting
beyond the call of duty, but the decisions we are discussing in this paper are governed by duty – by a higher
sense of duty, i.e., duty according to more demanding principles. From this point of view, heroism would be
the behaviour of “superior” people – superior in a double sense: (1) as acting according to the more demanding
principles and despising the possible harmful consequences of the decision for herself, and (2) as not being
required from ordinary people (i.e., people without well rooted virtues) in ordinary circumstances.parts– can a manager be “too ethical”? Can a manager be asked to be ethical come what
may? And what relationship is there between heroic behaviour and leadership? 
But is it appropriate to ask these questions? Yes, if we see that a situation’s ethical
burden is understood when it is taken to the limit.  
Here I will present a real-life case that is not taken from business experience but
from  the  history  of  a  country.  I  found  this  case  in  an  address  given  by  Vaclav  Havel,
President of the Czech Republic, in Barcelona, when he was given the Catalonia International
Prize in 1995 (1). The title of the address is “Ethics and Politics”, and I will reproduce here
the  paragraphs  that  are  most  relevant  to  my  purpose,  using  Havel’s  arguments  for  the
discussion, as if it was a case study in business ethics (2). I will first explain the case and the
arguments given by President Havel, after which I will turn to the problems raised by the
implementation of “more ethical” but more difficult (heroic?) solutions in the firm: whether
they are morally acceptable, whether they are mandatory for managers, and the relationship
existing between “heroic” behaviours and corporate leadership (3). 
The case of the Czech Republic
The facts  
“The fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War led me to reflect,
once again, on the turbulent modern history of my country. And once again, I realise
that, in fact, the central theme of this history is one which is always present, and one
which  has  always  greatly  interested  me:  the  relationship  between  morality  and
politics. (...)
“There have been several key moments in this history when the leaders of our
country  were  confronted  with  the  same  overwhelming  dilemma:  to  harm  the
population by submitting it to a dictatorship, or to harm it by not submitting to this
dictator. Invariably, they chose the first alternative (...)
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(1) The Catalonia International Prize was instituted in 1989 by the Generalitat de Catalunya (the autonomous
government of Catalonia). It is awarded by the Institut Català de la Mediterrània d’Estudis i Cooperació
(Catalan Mediterranean Institute of Studies and Cooperation). In 1995, the prize was awarded to the writer
and President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, and to the lawyer, former mayor of Berlin and former
President of the German Republic, Richard von Weizsäcker, for the profound ethicality of their political
careers.
(2) Cfr. Havel (1995). The addresses were published in Catalan, Spanish, French, English, German, and Czech.
(3) Vaclav Havel was born in Prague on October 5, 1936. In 1960 he began working at Prague’s Theater on the
Balustrade, first as a stagehand and later as an assistant director and dramaturg. From 1962 to 1966, he studied
dramaturgy  at  the  Academy  of  Performing  Arts  in  Prague.  Vaclav  Havel  actively  opposed  the  Russian
invasion and the resulting hard-line Communist policies. His work was banned in Czechoslovakia in 1969. In
1977  Havel  became  a  co-founder  and  one  of  the  first  three  spokesmen  of  the  Charter  77  human  rights
initiative. He was incarcerated several times for his beliefs. In November 1989 he became one of the leaders of
the Civic Forum opposition movement, which helped bring about the end of Communist rule. On December
29, 1989, Vaclav Havel was elected President of Czechoslovakia. After the June 1992 parliamentary elections,
it began to be clear that the Czech and Slovak federation was heading for dissolution, and Havel resigned from
the federal presidency on July 20. On January 26, 1993, Vaclav Havel was elected the first President of the
Czech  Republic.  Keane  (1999)  offers  a  recent  (and  controversial)  biography  of  Vaclav  Havel.  Some  of
Havel’s  recent  articles  and  speeches  have  been  published  in  Havel  (1986,  1991,  1998).  An  overview  of
Havel’s views on anthropology and ethics can be found in Ericson (1998). “The  first  terrible  dilemma  was  faced  by  Eduard  Benes,  the  president  of
Czechoslovakia at the time of the Munich Pact. He was well aware that the Pact
represented the aggression of a madman sanctioned by the approval of our allies of
the time, who not only betrayed the agreements that they had signed, but also the
values they professed. Benes knew that, from the point of view of national honour
and  the  salvation  of  the  moral  integrity  of  our  national  community,  the  correct
response would have been to refuse to yield before the dictatorship and to opt for the
defence of the country. At the same time, he also knew that this decision would have
meant the death of thousands of people, the destruction of the country, and probably
its rapid military defeat by a much stronger rival. He knew that such a decision
would  undoubtedly  have  met  with  the  incomprehension  and  opposition  of  the
democratic world, which would have accused him of being a destroyer of peace, a
provocative and reckless gambler who stupidly hoped to drag other nations into an
absolutely unnecessary war.
“He opted for capitulation without a struggle because he felt that this was
more responsible than risking a subsequent capitulation which would have entailed
immense sacrifice.
“The same man found himself faced with a similar situation in February 1948,
when  he  could  have  opposed  the  leaders  of  the  Communist  coup,  who  were
supported by the powerful Soviet Union and a section of the population, thereby
running the risk of a bloodbath that would have only served to forestall an inevitable
Communist  victory.  The  alternative  was  to  withdraw  without  resistance  and
voluntarily open the door to the many long years of totalitarian government. And
Benes –an old, ill and disillusioned man– once again opted for capitulation.
“The political representatives of Czechoslovakia capitulated for the third time
after the Soviet invasion of our country in 1968, when they were all taken to the
Soviet Union where, after several days of humiliations and threats, they all –with
just one exception– signed the Moscow Protocols, which legalised the occupation of
Czechoslovakia  and  constituted  the  first  decisive  step  towards  the  shamelessly
denominated ‘normalisation’ which followed.” (Havel 1995, 128-130)
The arguments
In his assessment of these decisions, Havel clearly states his opinion. After asserting
that “(i)nvariably they [the Czech politicians] chose the first alternative”, that is, surrender, he
says, “and I always thought that this was a fatal error. I still think so today” (p. 128). Let us
take a closer look at his arguments (1). 
1)  Havel defines the problem faced by the Czech people and decision-makers in
the following terms:
“In each of these three dilemmas the people who were trapped could opt for a
‘more ethical’ solution, but one that entailed the risk of inestimable loss of life
and  incalculable  human  suffering;  or  they  could  opt  for  a  ‘more  realistic’
decision,  which  was  unlikely  to  cause  such  great  direct  losses.  They  were
confronted by two opposing dimensions of political responsibility: on the one
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(1) It is not my intention to confer any special moral authority on Havel. However, his analysis of these moral
problems seems to me to be particularly suggestive and apt. hand,  responsibility  for  the  moral  integrity  of  society,  and  on  the  other,
responsibility for human lives. This must be a terrible dilemma, and one that
cannot be judged easily by anyone who has never faced such a situation.” (p.
131)
2)  He  also  points  out  that  one  cannot  force  a  parallelism  between  the  three
historical situations: 
“Drawing  comparisons  between  different  historical  situations  is  obviously
risky. This is also true for the cases that I have just mentioned, where different
people  with  different  experiences,  in  different  international  and  national
conditions had to take decisions on very different matters. Volumes of words
have been written about each of these three dilemmas –eyewitness accounts,
books  of  memoirs  and  historical  analyses–  and  anyone  who  has  taken  an
interest in these three events knows very well that it would be gratuitous to
attempt to equate these three dark moments of our modern history in any way.”
(p. 130)
And yet, “some general analogies that can be found between them cannot be
ignored” (p. 130), because experience forms part of the pool of prudence which
should be used to take decisions: 
“These three decisions had very similar consequences: a profound upheaval of
society and its long term demoralisation. It might even be said that these three
events are connected by a fine –almost invisible– thread of causal relation or
continuity: without the trauma of Munich, the conditions which were relatively
favourable  to  the  Communist  offensive  –to  which  the  democrats  finally
succumbed– would probably not have existed after the war; and if the victory
of the Communists in 1948 had not been so easy, it is likely that the reformist
Communists of 1968 would have put up more of a fight. I do not think that the
Czechs, or rather the Czechs and the Slovaks, are morally any worse than any
other  nation.  I  do  feel,  however,  that  the  decades  since  the  signing  of  the
Munich  Pact  in  1938  have  marked  our  country  with  a  very  specific  moral
frustration, and that the three political decisions that I am talking about here
had a decisive influence on this frustration, on its origin, its development and
its  intensification.  Our  democracy,  or  rather  our  desire  for  democracy,  was
given up without a fight on three occasions, a fact that has been profoundly
imprinted  upon  the  consciousness  of  our  society  leaving  behind  a  sinister
stigma.” (pp. 131-132)
3)  The paragraphs I have just reproduced summarise the core ideas of Havel’s
reasoning.  All  three  decisions  had  negative  effects  on  the  citizens,  their
political representatives and their leaders; effects that were not only political or
sociological but above all ethical. They had surrendered their rights –which, in
these cases, were also duties– too easily, without a fight. They did not value
highly  enough  the  country’s  freedom  and  independence,  and  all  that  that
signifies (1). In addition, each time they surrendered that right, they diminished
their ability to defend it in the future, through a negative learning process, first
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(1) There were, of course, other values at stake: above all, the lives of many citizens. Havel acknowledges
them, but places the emphasis on values which he considers no less important, and which, in his view, were
not given due consideration in those decisions. in  themselves,  as  they  waived  virtues  such  as  courage,  strength,  love  of
freedom and a healthy patriotic pride, and started to acquire the opposite vices,
and second, in their enemies, as by displaying their weakness, they became an
easier and less dangerous target for future attacks.
“Is it not true that the consequences of what we might call these ‘less moral’
decisions were, from a political point of view, profoundly pernicious? Did the
moral  traumas  caused  by  these  decisions  not  have  serious  political
consequences in the long term? We do not know what the consequences of the
alternative  decisions  –the  so-called  ‘more  moral’  alternatives–  would  have
been. We can, however, easily imagine that they would not necessarily have
had such pernicious, profound, lasting and fatal consequences. It is probable
that, in the short term, there would have been greater loss of human life and
more  material  damage,  and  that  more  people  would  have  had  to  endure
physical suffering. However, one may ask: would these alternatives not have
prevented  other  losses  –less  visible,  but  deeper  and  more  prolonged–  that
ended up wreaking havoc on the moral integrity of our national community? It
is very difficult to weigh up the different types of losses and judge how many
human lives it is worth sacrificing –and how many it is not worth sacrificing–
for the long-term health of society and its prolonged immunity against new
evils.” (p. 132)
4)  Beyond  political  and  economic  arguments,  Havel’s  appraisal  is  based  on
anthropological and ethical arguments, since 
“(n)one of us knows, nor will we ever know, what would have happened if the
people who took these three decisions had opted for the alternative course of
action.  History  is  characterised  by  the  phenomenon  which  physicists  call
‘singularity’: there is only one succession of events, there are no alternatives
that we can compare, there is no conditional ‘what if’. For this reason, it is
necessary to use great caution and objectivity in evaluating decisions which
have been taken and to avoid overly simplistic judgements.” (p. 131)
5)  Therefore, Havel shows that the role of ethics in decision making does not
consist of obtaining a certain result, but in living a certain way and being a
certain person (1). 
6)  From  this,  it  is  to  be  inferred  that  ethics  must  be  directly  present  in  all
decisions, that is, there are no economic, political or ethical decisions but just
decisions, in which we always find these three dimensions. So it cannot be
argued that the actions being considered by Havel were solely political.    
“My aim here is to show how difficult it is to counterpose politics and morals
(...) (M)orality and immorality have direct political consequences, and, vice
versa, political decisions have direct moral consequences. So I believe that it is
foolish  to  separate  politics  from  morality  and  to  declare  that  they  are  two
different and unconnected things. To state such a thing, or, with even greater
5
(1) Socrates said that it was worse to cause injustice than to suffer it, because the person suffering injustice
receives it from without, while the person who carries out the injustice creates injustice within himself and
becomes an unjust person. Cfr. Plato, Gorgias, 527b. reason, to put it into practice, is –paradoxically– not only profoundly immoral
but also, at the same time, politically erroneous. Morality is omnipresent, as is
politics; and politics that distances itself from morals is simply bad politics.”
(p. 132) (1). 
7)  Havel also points out the factors that must be taken into account when making
a decision from an ethical viewpoint – and, therefore, when judging it:
“In this situation [of not knowing the effects of their decisions] they [the Czech
politicians]  could  only  rely  on  their  own  judgement  and  suppositions.
Fundamentally, everything depended on the depth of their understanding of the
particular  situation  and  on  their  own  imagination  in  foreseeing  the
consequences of their decisions, whatever these might be. They were all aware
that they had to choose between two evils, and they all tried to weigh up the
arguments to decide which would be the lesser of the two evils.” (p. 130)
However, his approach is not confined to considering the consequences. Or
rather, in his consideration, he introduces a very wide range of consequences,
in which the effects of the previously stated negative learning are apparent.
Thus, all the ingredients of a prudent decision are given: 1) an action that is not
intrinsically bad but has harmful effects (2); 2) a series of reasons or intentions
(above all, seek what is good, or less bad, for the country); and 3) a series of
circumstances (the attitudes of their allies and enemies, the country’s situation,
the historical background, etc.), including the wide range of consequences.
“(W)hat would I do today if I were confronted with a similar dilemma, without
knowing,  without  being  able  to  know  –just  as  they  did  not  know–  the
consequences my decision would have?
“I think that I would try to weigh up objectively all the possible circumstances
surrounding my decision, that I would seek the advice of many people who had
my complete confidence, I would make a global analysis of the situation, and
would  try  to  calculate  rationally  the  various  possible  consequences  of  my
actions. If after doing all of this I still did not know what I should do, then most
probably I would recur to the final arbiter, one which, while perhaps not totally
reliable, has more than once been shown to be the surest guide, namely my
conscience, my ethical intuition, that which I bear within –at least that is how I
feel about it–, that something which is greater than me as a person.” (p. 133)  
And, in the light of all this, Havel explains the responsibility of the person who
has to take the decision: 
“We all know what are called pangs of conscience. The strange and unpleasant
sensation of having betrayed something in ourselves, or something higher than
ourselves; the sensation of having sunk into a kind of mud, or of having soiled
ourselves with something repugnant, the feeling of having done something that
we must explain to someone who resides within us or above us; accompanied
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(1) This implies that management that distances itself from morals is simply bad management.
(2) Note that the alternatives available were not radically bad because of their purpose but because of their
consequences. by the feeling that the longer we continue to do it, the less convinced we feel of
our cause. This represents a state of profound existential pain, it is the contact
with what philosophers call nothingness. And on the other hand, we are all
familiar with the exaltation we feel when we choose something that bring us no
visible benefit, but which we are sure is in consonance with the demands that
–through our conscience– the so-called universal moral order imposes on us.”
(p. 133) (1)
8)  Havel does not consider decision-making as a collective activity, that is, in the
context of a government or a Parliament, but as a personal responsibility of the
individual who presides over such a collective body or, more likely, as the
shared but equally personal responsibility of each of the individuals who make
up  the  body.  Collective  “heroic”  decision  making  undoubtedly  involves
specific difficulties, but in the main they are difficulties for individual persons.
9)  Interestingly, Havel does not try to formulate a political or moral judgement of
those events, because “(t)he people who took these decisions obviously did not
know what we know today; that is, they did not know what the consequences
of  their  actions  would  be;  and  in  general,  they  did  not  know  what  course
history would take in the wake of their decisions.” (p. 130)
And when he asks himself again “the question as to what I would have done
had I found myself in the place of my predecessors, faced with the dilemmas
that they were confronted with” (p. 132), he answers:
“I confess that I do not know. I can only say I believe that I would probably not
have taken the decision that they did.” (p. 133)
This means that he not only acknowledges the difficulty that such a decision entails
but, above all, that the person taking the decision does so in accordance with the dictates of
his  own  conscience,  using  the  information  available  to  him  and  applying  his  powers  of
judgement.  Ethical  decisions  do  not  consist  of  applying  rules  but  formulating  careful,
methodical,  accurate  judgements,  governed  by  the  virtue  of  prudence  (2).  Hence  his
statement: “today I feel a greater understanding for the weight that bore on the people who
had to take those historic decisions” (p. 129).
Demanding decisions and corporate leadership
Without  seeking  to  establish  a  parallel  between  the  dilemmas  of  the  Czech
politicians and the decisions made by entrepreneurs, there is no doubting that they, too, often
find  themselves  faced  with  ethically  difficult  problems,  which  may  have  very  important
consequences  for  them,  their  companies  and  other  stakeholders.  Examples  would  be
decisions  to  promote  or  allow  a  merger  or  takeover,  close  the  company,  make  massive
layoffs, withdraw from markets where there are endemic corruption problems, etc.; and from
a positive viewpoint, decisions to create employment or develop the local community or the
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(1) The conscience is the subject of the whole process, and not just of this last step.
(2) Cfr.  Pieper  (1966).  I  use  here  the  word  “prudence”  in  the  classic  sense  of  the  term,  not  as  “what  is
practical”, which is its modern concept, and less still as a synonym of astuteness. country  when  times  are  hard,  empower  subordinates,  drastically  change  the  organization
when there is a crisis, etc. And management literature has dwelt on these difficult decisions
and  the  characters  of  the  men  and  women  who  make  them,  though  almost  always  the
emphasis is on the uncommon and highly personal nature of such behaviours (1).
Our purpose in this section is to build on the arguments advanced by Havel to discuss
to what extent managers can and/or should act in a way that goes “beyond the call of duty” (2).
Can it be unethical to be “too ethical”?
The first question we must ask is: is Vaclav Havel’s stance “too ethical” – and,
therefore,  dubiously  ethical,  or  clearly  unethical,  particularly  when  we  apply  it  to  the
company?
When viewed from the point of view of the “consequentialist ethics” or the “ethics
of responsibility”, the answer would probably be yes: the “ethics of convictions” may be
undesirable because of its results (3): in the Czech case, because of the loss of human lives
and  the  destruction;  in  the  company,  because  of  the  financial  losses,  the  destruction  of
organisational capital, unemployment, etc. 
And, yet, what Havel shows is that there are other consequences which must be
taken into account and which do not appear in the analyses performed from the ethics of
responsibility. If people learn from their own and other people’s actions –which is something
that is beyond the scope of consequentialism–, we must consider the effects of that learning.
This no doubt complicates the ethical analysis. Indeed, if the scope of an action’s effects is
sufficiently defined (in terms of revenues, expenses, profits, layoffs, etc.), it may be relatively
simple to perform a consequentialist calculation. However, as Havel points out, the exclusion
of other effects (those deriving from moral learning) is arbitrary and may lead us to take
wrong decisions which will be inconsistent when subsequent decisions are considered (4). 
Obviously, this does not mean that a manager must act in accordance with a self-
contained  ethics  of  convictions,  without  taking  into  account  the  context.  The  decision
preferred by Havel is not the result of an unchangeable moral conviction or the resolve to
always  act  “in  accordance  with  moral  standards”,  but  it  also  takes  into  account  the
consequences, albeit understood in a broad sense which takes into consideration the moral
learning, the internal results of decisions, as we have already said. 
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(1) See, for example, the biographies of Lee Iacocca (Iacocca and Novak 1986), Jack Welch (O’Boyle 1999),
Ricardo Semler (Semler 1995), Anita Roddick (Roddick 2001), Muhammad Yunus (Yunus and Jolis 1999),
Clarence Walton (Duska 1998), Akio Morita (Morita 1988), John Sculley (Sculley and Byrne 1987), T.
Monagham (Monagham and Anderston 1986) and J. C. Penney (O’Tibbets et al., 1999). Some recent books
present a varied sample of the behaviour of different leaders: for example, Teal (1989), Turner and Chappell
(1999), Forbes (1998). In all these works we see at least some of the features of excellent, even heroic
behaviour (determination, capacity for self-sacrifice, fortitude, perseverance, etc.), although not all of them
can be offered as models of ethical behaviour.    
(2) Obviously, other people in the company may also act heroically. If we do not mention them here it is
because we are interested in the decisions made by managers and, as Havel’s texts suggest, the very top
managers in the organization.  
(3) The distinction is by Max Weber.
(4) An  action  is  inconsistent  if,  after  time  has  passed,  it  is  apparent  that  another  action  would  have  been
preferable, without any new information having appeared. It can be said that the demoralisation of society
to  which  Havel  refers  became  apparent  after  the  first  decision  in  Czechoslovakia.  However,  that  was
(expected) information that should have been taken into account when taking the first decision.Note that I am not saying that Havel is right when he says that the decision to open
the gates of Czechoslovakia to Hitler had catastrophic results since, as he himself says, that
can only be appreciated by someone who has all the elements of judgement necessary for
taking the decision. What seems important to me is that those possible results be taken into
consideration by the person who must take the decision. And this leads us to question the
terms of the debate opened by Max Weber. On the one hand, the ethics of consequences must
consider the internal learning which modifies the consistency of future actions. On the other
hand, the ethics of convictions must go beyond the mere observance of rules and include in
its analysis the consequences associated with moral principles. 
So we can now answer our question about the morality of “too ethical” decisions. 1) If
they are taken strictly applying the ethics of conviction, observing the rule because the rule must
be observed, they may lead to less ethical behaviours. 2) From the viewpoint of the ethics of
responsibility, it is likely that most of the “too ethical” or “heroic” decisions will be considered
immoral. 3) However, when moral learning is taken into account, that is, the actions’ impact on
people’s attitudes, values and virtues, it is likely that heroic behaviours could be morally justified. 
Should managers be heroic?
We  have  just  seen  that,  when  faced  with  decisions  that  may  have  very  harmful
consequences for people, for the organisation and for themselves, managers can be heroic, in
the sense that they may opt for the “more ethical” solutions. However, is it their duty to be
heroic in such cases?
The ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility cannot help us come to a
decision in such problems, as we have already seen. However, an ethics based on goods,
norms and virtues can help us (1). It is not my purpose here to offer a detailed analysis of this
approach but merely to suggest how it can help us answer our question.
Ethics has a negative component –do not cheat your customers, do not tell lies in
your advertising, do not exploit your employees, etc.–, because it points to the limits beyond
which  man’s  behaviour  may  be  harmful.  These  are,  thus,  ethical  minimums,  which  are
characteristic of the ethics of norms (2). Sometimes, these minima can be ethical absolutes,
so that she who infringes them destroys herself as a person. In such cases, obedience of the
norm may be demanded without limitations, to the point of heroism. However, in business
life, it is very unlikely that one will reach such extremes (3). 
However, when conceived as the science of human development, ethics is eminently
positive: do –it tells us– do good, do more,... create more companies, produce more, improve
your  products’  quality,  create  more  jobs,  research,  innovate,  grow,  reach  more  markets,
improve the quality of the men and women you work with, develop the community in which
you operate,... This is the ethics of goods – or of excellence (4). And it is this ethics that
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(1) Cfr. Polo (1991, 1996). 
(2) This does not mean that these minimums are determined directly from the norm: the prohibition to cheat
customers must be converted in each specific case into a recommendation for action. 
(3) A moral absolute can be, for example, that one cannot kill an innocent man. A manager may find herself in
a situation where she would have to sacrifice everything –the company’s existence, her personal assets, her
professional future, her workers’ jobs, etc. – unless she kills an innocent man. However, this does not seem
to me to be a likely situation in the business world (except perhaps in gangster circles).
(4) Solomon (1992, 247) also points out these two dimensions of ethics: “Much of what is discussed under the
title of ‘morality’ has to do with fulfilling obligations (...) consists of prohibitions rather than positive
recommendations  of  ideals  for  action  (...).  Extraordinary  behavior,  heroic  and  saintly  deeds,  would  be
ignored in such a conception”. Havel seems to have in mind when he says that resisting the unfair threat of invasion may
bring more and higher goods (and they must be much higher and much more for many more
people,  considering  their  cost:  the  loss  of  human  lives  that  resisting  the  invasion  or  the
military coup will entail) (1).
In this sense, it can be said that a manager has the “duty” to adopt the “most ethical”
solution, even if it is also the most costly in terms of her personal preferences, her income,
her career, etc., and in terms of the welfare of other people – her company’s shareholders,
employees, customers, suppliers, et (2). It is not a “duty” in the same sense in which a
manager has a “duty” not to steal, lie or embezzle. But nor is it something supererogatory,
“beyond the call of duty” – or, at least, that is not what Havel thinks. 
The key to this sense of the word “duty” lies in the fact that the company is a
community  of  stakeholders  –shareholders,  managers,  workers,  customers,  suppliers,  local
community, etc.– none of whom has a perfect knowledge of what is good for the company as
a whole or for each of them individually (3). One of the tasks of the company’s management
consists precisely in guessing it, not as a game or bet, but as a moral obligation. Managing a
company demands, above all, taking into account the real needs of the external stakeholders,
in  order  to  define  the  company’s  external  mission,  and  the  real  needs  of  the  internal
stakeholders, in order to define its internal mission (4).
In what sense is this a “duty”? In the same sense in which it is a “duty” to manage
well. If managers confine themselves to supplying the market with the goods and services
that  customers  demand,  giving  the  employees  a  job  and  a  salary  as  laid  down  in  their
contract, and complying with all the legal regulations regarding the environment and taxes,
they cannot be said to be bad managers, but neither are they excellent. However, if they
anticipate customers’ needs, if they help the workers to improve as persons and develop the
company’s  distinctive  capabilities,  and  if  they  demonstrate  an  effective  concern  for  the
common good of the community, then they are “good” or “excellent” managers. Are they
doing anything “beyond the call of duty”? No: they are simply acting in accordance with the
ideal of what constitutes a good manager (5): ethics is no more than good management. And
beyond the minimum (run-of-the-mill management), there is a wide range of possible action,
corresponding to different (simultaneously technical and ethical) qualities of management.
Yet acting in this way may, on occasions, require making difficult decisions, similar
to those Havel spoke about. And if this leads to heroic behaviour, then the heroism is not an
extra but part of the “duties” of a good manager. Or, to put it another way: 1) a manager may
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(1) An interesting, but extreme, case of this type of heroic action is that portrayed in the film Schindler’s List: a
German manager ends up deciding to generously use his resources and power to save Jews from the death
camps, without him having any “need” to. However, the moral analysis of Schindler’s motivations and the
rest of his behaviour would be quite complex. 
(2) There are other relevant questions. For example: why me? It is usually not a question of merit but of
vocation, of a meaning given to one’s life, as a consequence of personal circumstances. Cfr. Yepes (1993). 
(3) Here I am following closely the theses of Pérez-López (1993). I would like to thank Professor Josep M.
Rosanas for helping me to understand this point. 
(4) Real needs, not simply the needs they state: because perhaps they “need” more demanding work, and that is
what the managers have a “duty” to give them, even though it is not what they are asking for, and even
though it may be difficult for both of them.
(5) Kennedy and Deal (1982) point out that “(h)eroism is a leadership component that is all but forgotten by
modern  management.  Since  the  1920s,  the  corporate  world  has  been  powered  by  managers  who  are
rationalists, who do strategic planning, write memos and devise flow charts... Managers run institutions;
heroes create them” (quoted in Solomon 1992, 248, footnote 2). (and should) have to be heroic when a moral imperative prohibits her from doing anything
radically bad, but 2) she may (and should) also be heroic when, in the performance of her
duties, she tries to obtain the best for herself, for the company and for all its stakeholders.
That is, in a word, the manager’s ordinary heroism (1). And, in both cases, she must reckon
with the natural difficulty that her decision entails (2).
However, this immediately raises another problem: does a manager have the right to
take decisions that seriously affect these other people’s welfare? Should she not at least ask
their opinion? 
Any person vested with authority must perform the duties that are inherent to her
position.  Insofar  as  the  manager  is  responsible  for  decisions  that  may  be  crucial  for  the
company’s existence and, therefore, for the fate of other people, it is her duty to take them.
Havel does not doubt in conferring this right (and duty) on the person appointed to be the
country’s  leader  in  the  cases  he  analyses.  When  faced  with  a  difficult  decision,  such  as
closing a company, a manager having the power and authority to take the decision but lacking
the courage to take it is failing in her duty. However, if she does not have the power but is
dependent, for example, on the owners’ placet, then it is they who must take the decision,
although the manager will have to propose the decision she considers most advisable (even if
it is the solution that is ethically most demanding).
In any case, in any decision making exercise, the manager must consider the effects
of her actions on others and ask them their opinion, if possible (Havel mentions asking for
advice  as  a  significant  component  of  this  type  of  decision).  However,  the  ultimate
responsibility falls on the manager. Taking other people’s opinion into account does not mean
always heeding that opinion, even if it is unanimous (particularly in situations such as those
considered by Havel, where it is likely that the advice of the affected parties will not take into
account the ethical learning we have  referred to earlier).
And that does not signify a dictatorial attitude on the part of the manager, who
should never carry out anything that is directly harmful to other stakeholders, but should
engage in dialogue with them, explaining the reasons for her decisions and compensating
them as appropriate for any damage her actions may cause them.
Heroism and leadership
Our previous remarks lead us to the last point I intended to discuss here. What is the
relationship  that  exists  between  taking  ethically  demanding,  “more  moral”  decisions  and
leadership? (3)  
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(1) “Creating value where none existed; saving and creating jobs; doing what’s right, productive and beneficial;
standing alone, often without support, often against formidable opposition; doing the hard intellectual work
of conceiving a vision and the hard moral work of staying true to it – aren’t these the kinds of acts we
associate with heroism?” (Teal 1989, xvi). And he immediately adds that this is so even though the manager
receives a reward for it in terms of a high salary, prestige, etc.
(2) “Doing the right thing can mean stifling the instinct for self-preservation. It can mean engaging in a struggle
that you know you cannot win. It can mean confronting loss, pain, even death, armed only with the cold
comfort that you are doing, if not the best there is, at least the best you can” (Teal 1989, xi-xii). This way of
seeing the manager’s behaviour coincides with the conception of the hero “as the human being who seeks to
achieve a goal, and who is willing to try even though he may be threatened by obstacles, even if they seem
insuperable” (Aranguren 2000, 107).
(3) The literature on leadership and its ethical dimension is already very extensive. See, for example, Badaracco
and Ellsworth (1989), Burns (1978), Ciulla (1998), Fairholm (1991), Greenleaf (1977), Spears (1998).  In  my  opinion,  it  is  one  of  the  components  of  a  company  manager’s leadership
function (1). As I said earlier, a good manager is a person who, in her decisions, takes into
account the fundamental effects of her actions on other people. Therefore, the politician that
Havel is thinking of is a good manager, in the sense that she thinks of what her citizens need,
now and in the future: what they need, not what they prefer (which will no doubt be to avoid
war), and not only the citizens who are alive today but also those who have yet to be born (2).
A leader is a good manager who seeks, in her actions, to improve her subordinates’
motivational structure, so that they feel encouraged to act increasingly in accordance with deep
motivations, that is, with motivations that improve their ability for ethical learning and, therefore,
their ability to take better decisions in the future. The politician that Havel has in mind precisely
tries to follow this line of action: she does not seek the approval of her collaborators, subjects and
allies but wishes to enable all of them to act following the same principles (3). 
Note that such a leader will very likely end up failing, if we judge her action by its
results. In the case of Havel, the country will be invaded, the leader will probably be killed,
imprisoned or exiled, and the citizens will probably suffer considerably during the following
years. However, insofar as she attains her goal –the moral learning of her citizens, that is, that
they understand the “real value” of their actions, the deep effects of their actions on themselves
and  on  others–  her  decision  will  have  been  a  success.  Indeed,  even  if  her  citizens  do  not
improve –after all, they are free and can choose to accept or not the lesson their leader offers
them– she will have taken the best possible decision, the most ethical decision, and will be an
excellent leader, even if no-one acknowledges it (4). “Doing the job well not only contributes to
success, it is a kind of success, whether or not the company succeeds” (Teal, 1989, xv). 
In short, the manager-leader is a person who is trusted by her subordinates, not so
much (or not only) because of her professional competence but, above all, because they know
that she will always try to do that which is best for the company and for its stakeholders. The
subordinates may not understand why she decides a certain action (why she immerses the
country in a suicidal war, in the case of the politician), but they can understand that it is the
best for them, even though the short-term costs of that decision may be very high.
The leader will be capable of taking such decisions because she will have acquired
the habit of always deciding as a just, prudent, truthful, upright person..., that is, because she
will truly live the virtues, understood not as more or less spontaneous ways of being, but as
the fruit of an effort to develop in oneself the moral learning mentioned previously, through
effort  and  repetition  of  acts  (5).  The  existence  of  virtues  is  precisely  what  builds  the
subordinates’ trust in the leader and allows her to take the right decisions in each situation,
even though they may be difficult and even heroic. This completes the three-sided vision of
the ethics of norms (prohibitions on minimums), goods (quest for excellence) and virtues
(development of abilities for acting correctly).
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(1) In the following paragraphs, the ideas I use are taken from Pérez-López (1997, 1998 chap. 3). 
(2) This is a relevant consideration: the good manager must take this consideration of the long term and look
after the needs of those who, at present, do not have a stake in the company. 
(3) Havel does not highlight this because he is considering a decision taken by a single person at the highest
level. And yet, the most important function of governance, in politics but in companies as well, is to
mobilise other people’s energy for action, for achieving results that change reality. 
(4) This would be the transcendental leadership described by Cardona (2000). 
(5) There is no contradiction in saying that a person needs training –the habitual practice of some fundamental
virtues– in order to make these singular decisions, since a person who does not have the habit of making
good decisions is very unlikely to make a good decision when faced with adverse circumstances.Conclusion
The dramatic cases proposed by Vaclav Havel may help entrepreneurs and managers
face their responsibilities in difficult situations, when being “more ethical” involves being
heroic and putting very valuable things on the line. One can generalise by saying that all
times are difficult times. And, above all, Havel’s examples bring to the surface considerations
that do not always appear in case studies of ordinary business decisions. 
Ethics  is  not  something  that  is  learnt  in  manuals,  lectures  or  seminars,  nor  by
studying lists of virtues, but in practice: first, in other people’s practice, in the example given
by people who possess virtues and apply them; and second, in one’s own practice, through
the effort to make those virtues more real each day. There is a spectacular heroism, the kind
shown by the person who has to take tragic decisions, such as those described by Havel. And
there is also a simple heroism, shown by the person who each day strives to do her duty
better.  Havel  does  not  explain  the  relationship  between  this  day-to-day  heroism  and  the
heroism that puts its holder in the golden pages of history. But that relationship exists: the
day-to-day hero can become an exceptional hero because, even though it has not been her
intention, she has been preparing herself for it every day. 
Thus, the role of the manager-leader is that of that discreet hero who, some day, may
have to take exceptional decisions. And when that day comes, she will be capable of taking
them because, every day, she will have been training for just such a time.
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